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The Territorial Principle in Criminal Law*
By Rollin M. Perkins**
THRE are four' different theories of criminal jurisdiction, namely:
(1) territorial, (2) Roman, (3) injured forum, and (4) cosmopoli-
tan.
The territorial theory takes the position that criminal jurisdiction
depends upon the place of perpetration. That is, the nation on whose
territory the crime was committed has jurisdiction of the offense. It is
a logical outgrowth of the conception of law enforcement as a means
of keeping the peace. The perpetrator, rather than the place of per-
pretration, is the determinant under the Roman theory. A nation, in
this view, has jurisdiction over its national wherever he may be and
hence can hold him accountable for his criminal misdeed wherever
committed. It is a logical outgrowth of the conception of law enforce-
ment as a means of disciplining members of the tribe or clan. While
sometimes referred to as the "personal" theory, the traditional label is
"Roman" because this was the position of the Roman law which held
the Roman citizen accountable to it wherever he might be.
The injured forum theory places the emphasis upon the effect of the
crime. A nation may take jurisdiction of any crime which has the
effect of causing harm to it. Although the label was not used, this was
* This was prepared for the VIII Congress of the International Academy of
Comparative Law and appears on pages 657-670 of Legal Thought in the United States
of America Under Contemporary Pressures, published for the American Association for
the Comparative Study of Law, Inc., by Etablissements Emile Bruylant, Brussels,
Belgium, 1970. It is reproduced here by express permission.
** Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
1. Some courts have listed five, designated as "territorial," "nationality," "pro-
tective," "universality" and "passive personality." Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d
882, 885 (5th Cir. 1967); Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1961);
United States v. Rodriguez, 182 F. Supp. 479 (S.D. Cal. 1960). In each case the
classification was taken, directly or indirectly, from the Introductory Comment to a pro-
posed Codification of International Law. See American Society of International Law,
Jurisdiction With Respect to Crime (pt. 1), 29 AM. J. INT'L L., 443, 445 (Supp. 1935).
The so-called "passive personality principle," based upon the nationality of the victim
of the crime, was not included as a separate category in the proposed Code itself. See
id. at 579. It is unnecessary, being clearly included within the "injured forum cate-
gory," designated therein as "protective."
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the theory relied upon in Hanks,2 which affirmed the conviction in
Texas of one who was not a Texan for a forgery committed by him in
Louisiana. Since the forged document purported to transfer title to
Texas land, the court held that "[w]hen this forgery was committed in
Louisiana, eo instante a crime was committed against, and injury done
to, the State of Texas, because it affected title to lands within her sov-
ereignty."3 Whether or not the forged document ever reached Texas
was considered so unimportant that it is not even mentioned in the
opinion. The crime had been committed, the court emphasized, the
instant the false document was made.
The position of the cosmopolitan theory is that any nation has
jurisdiction over any crime committed anywhere, by anyone. Need-
less to say, no nation has ever assumed to exercise such jurisdiction to its
full extent-or to any considerable extent. On the other hand, no na-
tion ignores it entirely. While seldom mentioned, this theory is drawn
upon to the extent necessary to authorize any nation having actual
control of a pirate, and evidence of his piracy, to convict him no mat-
ter who he may be, wherever his acts of piracy were committed, and
without reference to the harm resulting therefrom.4
With one exception, these theories were never thought of as being
mutually exclusive. A nation, for example, which regards the Roman
theory of primary importance does not hesitate to punish foreigners for
crimes committed on its territory. The exception was that the common
law recognized only the territorial theory of criminal jurisdiction. The
common law judges did not hesitate to punish the pirate, wherever his
piracy had been committed, but in doing so they were not applying the
common law but the law of nations. 5 And in deciding Hanks, it may
be added, the court relied entirely upon a statute which expressly
granted jurisdiction over the type of offense involved.
2. Hanks v. State, 13 Tex. Ct. App. R. 289 (1882).
3. Id. at 309.
4. "Pirates may, without doubt, be lawfully captured on the ocean by the public
or private ships of every nation, for they are, in truth, the common enemies of all
mankind, and, as such, are liable to the extreme rights of war." The Marianna Flora,
24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1, 40 (1826).
"As an international crime it is within the jurisdiction of all maritime states
wheresoever or by whomsoever committed." Dickinson, Is the Crime of Piracy Ob-
solete? 38 HAsv. L. REV. 334, 335 (1925).
5. Blackstone, it is true, speaks of "the offence of piracy, by common law; . .
but this is in his Chapter V "Of Offences against the Law of Nations," and he explains
that the law of nations was adopted and "held to be a part of the law of the land."
4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69, 67. In like manner the law merchant, although
distinct from the strict common law, became a part of the common law in the sense
that it was not statutory law.
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It would have been surprising if the common law had adopted
any basis for criminal justice other than the territorial principle, because
the beginning of our criminal justice in the troublous days of the dawn
of civilization in the British Isles was concerned so exclusively with the
problem of keeping the peace. This is evident from the old indictments
which all concluded with some such phrase as "against the peace of the
King."' 6 And the territorial principle was in fact adopted by the En-
glish judges in those early days, was carried forward there and into
this country, and became so firmly entrenched as to call forth the state-
ment that "the general and almost universal rule is that the character
of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law
of the country where the act is done."
7
Peculiarities of procedure resulted in a restricted application not
inherent in the principle itself. It made its first appearance in the homi-
cide cases. The grand jurors, before additional authority was granted
by Parliament, could inquire only into happenings in the county for
which they were sworn and could not inquire into any fact done outside
of that county.
And to so high a nicety was this matter antiently carried, that where
a man was wounded in one county, and died in another, the of-
fender was at common law indictable in neither, because no com-
plete act of felony was done in any one of them. .... 8
While this was corrected by statute which, in such a case, authorized an
indictment in the county in which the death should happen,9 it led to
the conclusion that each crime has a situs which, in the absence of
statute, determines the jurisdiction over that offense. The situs of
homicide was held to be where the fatal force impinged upon the body
of the victim.10
6. "All offences are either against the King's peace, or his crown and dignity;
and are so laid in every indictment." 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *268.
7. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909). "It is
fundamental that jurisdiction in criminal matters rests solely in the courts of the state
or country in which the crime is committed .... The nationality or citizenship of
the offender is immaterial." Comment, Jurisdiction Over Interstate Homicides, 10 LA.
L. REv. 87, 88 (1949). "Every offender must be prosecuted for his offense in the
place where the offense was committed ... " Levitt, Jurisdiction Over Crimes, 16
J. CRim. L.C. & P.S. 316, 324 (1925).
8. 4 BLACESTONE, COMMENTARIES *303.
9. Id. In this country if the fatal force is received in one state or county, and
death results therefrom in another, only the former has jurisdiction of the homicide in
the absence of statute. State v. Carter, 27 N.J.L. 499 (Sup. Ct. 1859). Under an
appropriate statute jurisdiction may be in either. Commonwealth v. Macloon, 101
Mass. 1 (1869).
10. The King v. Coombes, 168 Eng. Rep. 296 (Ex. 1785); United States v. Davis,
25 F. Cas. 786 (No. 14,932) (C.C.D. Mass. 1837).
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This, together with another equally arbitrary and unnecessary
rule, resulted in one of the most bizarre miscarriages of justice on rec-
ord. H, standing in North Carolina, fired across the state line a shot
which hit and killed B who was in the state of Tennessee. As there
seemed to be no justification, excuse or mitigation for the killing, H
was arrested in North Carolina, tried and convicted there for the mur-
der of B. This conviction was reversed on the ground that since the
fatal force took effect on the victim in Tennessee, only that state had
jurisdiction over this offense. 1 And later, when H was being held in
custody to be turned over to Tennessee authorities in extradition
proceedings, he was released by a writ of habeas corpus on the ground
that the Constitution and statutes of the United States call for extradi-
tion of one "who shall flee from justice"-and no other, and H who had
not been in Tennessee had obviously not fled therefrom. 2 In each case
the North Carolina court emphasized that the unfortunate result could
have been avoided had there been appropriate state legislation.' 3
The restricted application of the territorial principle was expressed
in this form: "'Jurisdiction' to punish was given . . .to the state in
which the actor's bodily movements 'took effect,' even though the physi-
cal motion, the 'act' in that sense, of the accused, occurred in another
state.""4  The development of this restricted application (prior to
change by statute) reached such results as these: Where different
jurisdictions are involved, the offense of obtaining property by false pre-
tenses is triable where the property is obtained and not where the false
pretense is made;1 5 robbery is triable where the property is taken from
the victim and not where he was first seized,' 6 or where the property
is subsequently taken; 17 forgery is committed where the false instru-
ment is made, and uttering a forged instrument is committed where it
11. State v. Hall, 114 N.C. 909, 19 S.E. 602 (1894).
12. State v. Hall, 115 N.C. 811, 20 S.E. 729 (1894).
13. The conviction of Hall in the first case could have been upheld if the state
had had a so-called "in whole or in part" statute to be mentioned presently. And he
would not have been released by habeas corpus if the state had had a statute embodying
the authority found in section six of the present Uniform Criminal Extradition Act.
This section, in substance, authorizes the governor to order the arrest and extradition of
one who is not a "fugitive" in the constitutional sense if, while not being within the
demanding state, he committed an act "intentionally resulting in a crime" therein.
14. Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE LJ.
457, 462 (1924).
15. Connor v. State, 29 Fla. 455, 10 So. 891 (1892).
16. Sweat v. State, 90 Ga. 315, 17 S.E. 273 (1892).
17. 2 M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN* 163.
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is actually offered as genuine;'" receiving stolen property is committed
at the place of receipt;19 libel is committed at the place of publica-
tion;2 0 bigamy is committed where the bigamous ceremony is per-
formed;2 the offense of sending a threatening letter is committed where
the letter is received;22 subornation of perjury is committed where the
false testimony is given and not at the place where the suborner was
when he exercised his influence over the witness; 23 and an assault with
intent to murder by shooting across the state line is committed where
the intended victim was at the time.
24
One offense, larceny, did not receive this restricted application of
the territorial principle. By resort to the so-called "continuing tres-
pass" theory, the thief was indictable either in the county in which the
goods were originally taken or in any county into which he later car-
ried them. 25  This was extended to include goods stolen in Scotland and
carried into England, or vice versa, because it was all within the "United
Kingdom. 26  In the application here some courts upheld the larceny
conviction of a thief who brought into the jurisdiction goods he had
stolen in another state,"1 whereas others limited it to different counties
within the state28 until a statute had expressly extended jurisdiction over
the other situation.29
The restricted application of the territorial principle did not neces-
sitate selection of the place where the harm took effect as the situs of the
crime. In fact, had it not been for the peculiar way in which the hold-
ing was developed, the place where the wrongdoer was at the moment
of perpetration might well have been selected as the situs of the crime.
But the development pushed in the other direction. The starting point,
as mentioned earlier, was a homicide in which the stroke received in
18. State v. Hudson, 13 Mont 112, 32 P. 413 (1893).
19. State v. Rider, 46 Kan. 332, 26 P. 745 (1891).
20. Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass. 304 (1825). Compare State v. Moore,
140 La. 281, 72 So. 965 (1916), in which the court in applying this concept used
"publication" in the popular meaning rather than the legal sense of "making known."
21. 1 M. HALE, PLEAS OF =m CRowN *692-93.
22. The King v. Girdwood, 168 Eng. Rep. 173 (K.B. 1776).
23. Commonwealth v. Smith, 93 Mass. (11 Allen) 243 (1865).
24. Simpson v. State, 92 Ga. 41, 17 S.E. 984 (1893).
25. 1 M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE.CRowN *507.
26. 4 BLAcKSToNE, CoMMENTARms *305.
27. State v. Bennett, 14 Iowa 479 (1863); Worthington v. State, 58 Md. 403
(1882).
28. Simpson v. State, 23 Tenn. 455 (1844); Strouther v. Commonwealth, 92 Va.
789, 22 S.E. 852 (1895).
29. Henry v. State, 47 Tenn. 279 (1870). See People v. Merrill, 2 Parker's Crim.
Rep. 590, 596-98 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1855).
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one county resulted in death in another, with the common law im-
passe being solved by an act of Parliament expressly authorizing in-
dictment in the latter county in such a case. The next step was a killing
in which both the stroke and the death happened in one county from a
a fatal force started by the slayer in another. The statute clearly au-
thorized indictment for this homicide in the county in which the victim
had been stricken and had died, whereas there was no statute authoriz-
ing an indictment in the county where the killer had been at the time.
The assumption, that in the absence of statute a crime can be recog-
nized as having been committed at one place only, left one point
clear: the situs of the homicide depended not upon the location of the
slayer but upon the location of the victim. The next point is not so
clear. Despite the apparent impasse, Hale tells us where
a man had been stricken in one country and died in another. . the
more common opinion was, that he might be indicted where
the stroke was given, for the death is but a consequent, and might
be found in another county . . . and if the party died in another
county, the body was removed into the county, where the stroke
was given, for the coroner to take inquest super visum corporis.3°
But application of the statute,3 ' enacted to prevent a possible miscar-
riage of justice, was not mandatory. It merely permitted the indict-
ment to be found in the county in which the death should happen.
Apparently the practice of carrying the body from the county in which
death occurred back to the county in which the mortal stroke was re-
ceived continued after the statute was passsed; East tells us that "it
seems from some authorities that the election to prosecute the appeal
in either county still continues. '32  And in upholding an indictment
which alleged that the victim died in another county, Mr. Justice Pat-
terson said: "The giving of blows which caused the death constitutes
the felony."3 In any event, as the rule ultimately crystallized, it came
to be, as previously stated, that the situs of criminal homicide was held
to be where the fatal force impinged upon the body of the victim.
34
30. 1 M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN *426.
31. 2 & 3 Edw. 6, c. 24 f.2.
32. 1 E. EAST, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 362.
33. Rex v. Hargrave, 5 Car. & P. 170, 171, 172 Eng. Rep. 925, 926 (1831).
The English statute was held to be common law in Missouri, and to authorize prose-
cution for murder either in the county in which the injury was received or the county
in which death resulted. State v. Blunt, 110 Mo. 322, 338, 19 S.W. 650, 654 (1892).
34. In speaking of homicide it was said, "the criminal act is the impingeing of the
weapon, whatever it may be, on the person of the party injured, and that must neces-
sarily be where the impingement happens." State v. Carter, 27 N.J.L. 499, 500
(1859); accord, United States v. Davis, 25 F. Cas. 786 (No. 14,982) (C.C.D. Mass.
1837); Green v. State, 66 Ala. 40 (1880); Commonwealth v. Apkins, 148 Ky. 207, 146
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In explaining the result thus reached by the restricted application
of the territorial principle, many judges made an unnecessary assump-
tion-that the defendant must be present in the jurisdiction in which
the death occurred-which then required resort to fiction. A Georgia
court stated:
Of course, the presence of the accused within this State is essential
to make his act one which is done in this State; but the presence
need not be actual. It may be constructive. The well established
theory of the law is, that where one puts in force an agency for the
commission of crime, he, in legal contemplation, accompanies the
same to the point where it becomes effectual. 35
And in this case the court pushed the fiction to the border of absurdity.
It was a prosecution for assault with intent to murder based upon a
shot fired into the state. The explanation continued:
He started across the river with his leaden messenger, and was op-
erating it up to the moment when it ceased to move, and was there-
fore, in a legal sense, after the ball crossed the state line up to the
moment that it stopped, in Georgia. 36
If that is the correct explanation for the result, the offense would not
have been triable in Georgia if the victim had been spared because the
bullet happened to lodge in a tree on the other side of the boundary.
A judge like Holmes would scorn the fiction and say:
Acts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and pro-
ducing detrimental effects within it, justify a State in punishing the
cause of the harm as if he had been present at the effect, if the
State should succeed in getting him within its power.37
The judges, in discussing the common law situs of a crime, it
would be emphasized, when referring to an act in one state producing a
"detrimental effect" in another, had reference to a direct physical ef-
fect and not some harm resulting indirectly. They had in mind some-
S.W. 431 (1912); State v. Foster, 8 La. Ann. 290 (1853); State v. Gessert, 21 Minn. 369
(1875); State v. Cream, 43 Mont. 47 (1911). "The great weight of the decisions hold
that, independent of any statutory provision upon the subject, the crime is committed,
and is punishable in the jurisdiction where the fatal wound or blow is given. In other
words, that it is not the place of death ...... Debney v. State, 45 Neb. 856, 859-60,
64 N.W. 446, 447 (1895).
35. Simpson v. State, 92 Ga. 41, 43, 17 S.E. 984, 985 (1893).
36. Id. at 46, 17 S.E. at 986.
37. Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911), quoted with approval in
Charron v. United States, 412 F.2d 657, 659 (9th Cir. 1969). "To speak of constructive
presence is to use the language of fiction, and so to hinder precise analysis. When a
man is said to be constructively present where the consequences of an act done else-
where are felt, it is meant that for some special purpose he will be treated as he would
have been treated if he had been present, although he was not." Hyde v. United States,
225 U.S. 347, 386 (1912) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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thing such as a fatal force started in one state which impinged upon the
body of the victim in another, or a false pretense made in one state
which resulted in the victim parting with his property in another. A
state may be harmed by the forgery of its securities abroad even if the
forgeries remain abroad. If it becomes known that such forgeries have
been made, this may cause hesitation in the buying of genuine securi-
ties for fear that they may not be genuine. Hence such forgeries
abroad are properly within the injured forum principle38 but not within
the territorial. A crime is not committed within the jurisdiction under
the territorial principle unless at least some part of the offense is there
committed.
Nothing inherent in the territorial principle of criminal jurisdic-
tion requires the recognition of only one point where the actual perpe-
tration of the crime has covered two or more. And modem legislation
has tended to remove the restriction developed by the common law.
The most common enactment for this purpose has been the so-called
"in whole or in part statute." The wording is in some such form as that
punishability under the laws of the state shall include "all persons who
commit, in whole or in part, any crime within this state."3  Under such
a provision it was held that a person who caused the death of another
in Delaware, by mailing a box of poisoned candy from California, was
properly triable for this murder in California.4"
The wording of such a statute has been criticized as inaccurate.
The argument is that as a matter of scientific jurisprudence, in the case
mentioned, while the homicide was committed partly in California and
partly in Delaware, the California crime-the violation of California
law-was committed wholly in California. 4  This has not tended in
38. In one case it was indicated that a statute expressly providing for the punish-
ment of those who should forge the state's securities outside the state was unconsti-
tutional. State v. Knight, 1 N.C. 44 (1799). But in this case the defendant was not
represented by counsel and the court ordered the prosecution dismissed because of
doubt as to the validity of the statute. The possibility of statutory authority for juris-
diction over crime beyond the territorial principle seems not to have been considered.
39. CAL. PEN. CODE § 27.
40. People v. Botkin, 132 Cal. 231, 64 P. 286 (1901). For an offense to be pun-
ishable under the "in whole or in part" statute what was done within the state must
have been sufficient to constitute an attempt to commit the crime if nothing more had
followed. People v. Werblow, 241 N.Y. 55, 148 N.E. 786 (1925).
41. This argument seems not to have found its way into the printed record. But
when the American Law Institute's Code of Criminal Procedure was being drafted, it
was this argument in the committee room which prevented the inclusion of an "in whole
or in part" section in the proposed code. Such a provision received only casual mention
in the commentaries. ALI CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 693 (official draft with com-
mentaries 1931).
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the least to prevent the carrying out of the legislative intent,42 as in the
case mentioned, but at times has resulted in an additional legislative
effort, such as the following:
Whenever a person, with intent to commit a crime, does any
act within this state in execution or part execution of such intent,
which culminates in the commission of a crime, either within or
without this state such person is punishable for such crime in this
state in the same manner as if the same had been committed en-
tirely within this state.
43
Where only one state is involved, there is not even any theoretical ob-
jection to a statute which places the venue in any county in which any
part of an offense is committed.44
Although the territorial principle was considered the exclusive
basis of criminal jurisdiction by the common law, the judges did not
hesitate to recognize the legislative power to establish jurisdiction on
some other basis. Thus in Hanks,45 mentioned above, the statute was
drawing upon the injured forum principle because the forgery in Louisi-
ana, while it might cast a cloud upon the title to Texas land, could not,
by any extension, be brought under the territorial principle. And an
English statute in the early 1800's 46 applied the Roman principle in
a statute which provided for the punishment of any English subject for
murder or manslaughter committed by him "whether within the King's
Dominions or without." In this country it was assumed at one
time that the Federal Government could, by statute, exercise criminal
jurisdiction on the Roman principle, but that the individual states
could not.47 The Supreme Court, however; did not recognize this limi-
tation. Thus in Skiriotes48 the court held it was within the power of
42. "Fortunately courts ... have therefore never, so far as I am aware, doubted
the validity of legislation giving authority to punish to the courts of the state in which
the accused was and in which he actually moved his body, even though the results of
such bodily action take place beyond the territorial limits." Cook, The Logical and
Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 457, 463 (1924).
43. CAL. PEN. CODE § 778a. See 18 U.S.C. § 3237 (1964) which deals with
offenses begun in one district and completed in another.
44. CAL. PEN. CODE § 781.
45. Hanks v. State, 13 Tex. Ct. App. R. 289 (1882).
46. 9 Geo. 4, c. 31, § 7 (1828). The validity of this statute was upheld in Re-
gina v. Azzopardi, 174 Eng. Rep. 776 (N.P. 1843).
47. "A nation recognized as such in the law of nations has jurisdiction over its
nationals wherever they may be to require or forbid them to do an act unless the exer-
cise of'this jurisdiction involves the violation of the laws or public policy of the state
where the national is." RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 63 (1934). See
People v. Merrill, 2 Parker's Crim. Rep. 590, 602 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1855).
48. Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941). See also Felton v. Hodges, 374
F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1967).
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Florida to punish specified acts by its citizens in the Gulf of Mexico
outside any territorial limits, where there is no conflict with acts of
Congress.
In the so-called common law countries, all criminal jurisdiction
not based upon the territorial principle must have statutory authority,
and a discussion of such legislation is beyond the scope of the present
undertaking except where a conflict may result. But the territorial
principle holds such a dominant position that no state may punish its
citizen for what he does in the exclusive territorial jurisdiction of an-
other state where what was done was lawful. California could not val-
idly make it a crime for its citizens to "play the slot machines" in Las
Vegas, Nevada, where this is lawful. Such a statute would violate
the full faith and credit clause.49
Under concurrent jurisdiction the problem is not so simple. Where
a river forms the boundary between two states, the actual physical
boundary is (in most instances) the center of the main navigable
channel of the river.5" By act of Congress, however, the states have
been given concurrent jurisdiction over the river.5 And while this is
an extension because it goes beyond the actual territory of the state, it is
jurisdiction under the territorial principle. An example is that Wash-
ington and Oregon have, by act of Congress, concurrent jurisdiction
over the Columbia River where it forms their common boundary.5 -
Oregon had a statute making it an offense to fish with a purse net
in the Columbia River and N, a citizen of Washington who had a
Washington license to fish there with a purse net, was convicted in
Oregon although his fishing had been on the Washington side of the
river. This conviction was affirmed by the Oregon Court, 53 but reversed
49. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. "Full faith and credit shall be given in each State
to the public Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings of every other State."
50. Iowa v. Illinois, 147 U.S. 1 (1893). For a different provision see Welsh v.
State, 126 Ind. 71, 25 N.E. 883 (1890), where the states had concurrent jurisdiction
over the river, although the low watermarks on each side of the river constituted the
boundaries of the respective states.
51. See, e.g., Act of April 18, 1818, ch. 67, § 2, 3 Stat. 428.
52. By section 1 of the Act of Congress of March 2, 1853, ch. 90, 10 Stat. 172,
all that part of the Territory of Oregon lying "north of the middle of the main channel
of the Columbia River" was organized into the Territory of Washington, and by sec-
tion 21 it is provided "[tihat the Territory of Oregon and the Territory of Washington
shall have concurrent jurisdiction over all offences committed on the Columbia River,
where said river forms a common boundary between said Territories." This was ex-
tended to include "jurisdiction in civil and criminal cases" in the act of Congress ad-
mitting Oregon into the Union. Act of February 14, 1859, ch. 33, § 1, 11 Stat. 383.
53. State v. Nielsen, 51 Ore. 588, 95 P. 720 (1908).
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by the Supreme Court of the United States. 4 Concurrent jurisdiction,
the Court said in substance, canot authorize Oregon to punish what is
done in Washington where it is lawful.
If Oregon had a statute expressly making it an offense for an Ore-
gon citizen to fish with a purse net anywhere in the Columbia River
where it forms the Oregon boundary and a citizen of Oregon should
engage in such fishing even though exclusively on the Washington side
of the river where such fishing was not unlawful under Washington
law, a conviction in Oregon might possibly be upheld. A state may
not by exercise of the Roman principle make criminal that which is
done in the exclusive territorial jurisdiction of another state where it
is lawful.5 5 And concurrent territorial jurisdiction will not authorize
one state to punish what is done in the actual territory of the other,
where it is lawful. But a combination of the Roman principle of juris-
diction coupled with concurrent (territorial) jurisdiction might be suf-
ficient to uphold such a conviction in Oregon. This is a point not yet
decided by the Court.
The territorial principle, with the constitutional limitation which
does not permit one state to punish what is done within the exclusive
territorial jurisdiction of another state, may be considered in other ap-
plications. The so-called "in whole or in part" statute is intended pri-
marily 6 to deal with the case in which the actor is himself in the enact-
ing state when he does what results in the consummation of the harm in
another state 5 -such as killing by shooting across the state line. No
statute is needed to give jurisdiction to the second state because that
state has jurisdiction under the common law.5 8 What is done within
the scope of the "in whole or in part" statute is not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of another state since by definition it is done partly within
the enacting state. Hence the limitation mentioned above does not
apply.
A statute which prohibits leaving the state with intent to do what is
therein prohibited is within the territorial principle because such a crime
is held to have been committed within the territory of the state. Doing
54. Nielsen v. Oregon, 212 U.S. 315 (1909).
55. People v. Merrill, 2 Parker's Crim. Rep. 590, 604 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1855).
56. In theory, at least, it would apply to an intermediate state in which part
of the crime was committed.
57. E.g., People v. Botkin, 132 Cal. 231, 64 P. 286 (1901).
58. In State v. Hall, 114 N.C. 909, 922, 19 S.E. 602, 606 (1894), it was men-
tioned that Tennessee had such a statute although not essential to its jurisdiction of
such a crime.
May 1971]
the prohibited act in another state is not the crime under such an enact-
ment, but only evidence of the intent at the time of leaving.59 Such a
statute may be worded in some such terms as:
Every person who leaves this state with intent to evade any of
the provisions of this chapter [duels and challenges], and to com-
mit any act out of this state such as is prohibited by this chapter,
and who does any act, although out of this state, which would be
punishable by such provisions if committed within this state, is pun-
ishable in the same manner as he would have been in case such act
had been committed within this state. 60
There may be a valid conviction under such a statute even if what was
ultimately done was lawful where done, because the very intent of the
enactment is to punish the inhabitant for leaving the state to do what is
prohibited within the state. 61
In the common law the territorial principle was the exclusive basis
for criminal jurisdiction, but the English judges could not conceive of
Englishmen being where there was no law. Hence if Englishmen went
to an uninhabited island or a land inhabited only by savages, the im-
permissible vacuum was avoided by holding that the English law was
taken to such a place. This has something of the appearance of the
Roman principle, but the theory was entirely different.
Where Englishmen establish themselves in an uninhabited or bar-
barous country, they carry with them not only the laws, but the sov-
ereignty of their own State; and those who live amongst them and
become members of their community become also partakers of and
subject to the same laws.
62
So controlling is the territorial principle of criminal jurisdiction in
the so-called common law countries that a statute intending to establish
such jurisdiction on some other principle must be very specific. The
English statute mentioned which established the Roman principle for
the offenses of murder and manslaughter expressly spoke of such of-
fenses committed by his Majesty's subjects "whether within the King's
dominions or without."63  This was sufficiently specific and was up-
held, 4 as mentioned above, but mere use of general words, broad
enough to go beyond the territorial principle, will not be interpreted to
accomplish that result.
59. People v. Merrill, 2 Parker's Crim. Rep. 590, 595, 603 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1855).
60. CAL. PEN. CODE § 231. The venue is in the county of which the offender was
an inhabitant when the offense was committed. Id. § 780.
61. People v. Merrill, 2 Parker's Crim. Rep. 590 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1855).
62. Advocate-General of Bengal v. Ranee Surnomoye Dossee, 15 Eng. Rep. 811,
824 (P.C. 1863).
63. 9 Geo. 4, c. 31, § 7 (1828).
64. Regina v. Azzopardi, 174 Eng. Rep. 776 (N.P. 1843).
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MacLeod is an excellent example. 65 In this case defendant had
been convicted of bigamy in New South Wales on proof that, having first
married in that colony, he later married another woman in St. Louis,
Missouri while the first wife was still living and not divorced. The con-
viction was under this statute:
Whosoever being married marries another person during the life of
the former husband or wife, wheresoever such second marriage
takes place, shall be liable to penal servitude for seven years.e
5a
This conviction was reversed by the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council. It was held that "whosoever" as here used means whoso-
ever and so forth "and who is amenable, at the time of the offence com-
mitted, to the jurisdiction of the Colony of New South Wales," and that
"wheresoever" as used in the statute means "wheresoever in this colony
the offense is committed." '66 It may be that the legislative body in-
tended to extend jurisdiction over bigamy by adding the Roman prin-
ciple67 to the territorial, but this result could not be achieved without
words so specific as to be unmistakable,68 because "every statute is pre-
sumed to be enacted with reference to the local jurisdiction of the leg-
islature of each state."69 This presumption, perhaps thought of at one
65. MacLeod v. Attorney General for New South Wales [18913 A.C. 455 N.S.W.
65a. Id. at 456.
66. Id. at 457.
67. The court said that if the ordinary meaning were given to the words, "it
would have been beyond the jurisdiction of the Colony to enact such a law." Id. at
458. As the court emphasized both "whosoever" and "wheresoever" it was obviously
thinking in terms of the cosmopolitan principle rather than the Roman. Extending
jurisdiction over the offense of bigamy by addition of the Roman principle would
have done no more than England had done with the crimes of murder and manslaughter.
68. The general words of a statute that "every person" who and so forth, must
be interpreted to mean who does what is thus prohibited within the territory of this
state. People v. Merrill, 2 Parker's Crim. Rep. 590, 601 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1855).
The nature of the crime itself might be such as to indicate very clearly an intent
to extend it beyond the territorial theory, such as the law making it an offense for a
United States consul knowingly to certify a false invoice, which is used for illustration
in United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 99 (1922). Additionally, see the other
illustrations given there and the statute actually involved in the case.
In People v. Foretich, 14 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 6, 92 Cal. Rptr. 481 (Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1970), this interpretation was recently applied to a statute reading: "It is
unlawful to use or operate or assist in using or operating any net, trap, line, spear, or
appliance, other than in connection with angling, in taking fish, except as provided in
this chapter or Chapter 4 of this part." CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 8603. This very
questionable application was assumed to be supported by Skirlotes v. Florida, 313 U.S.
69 (1942), in which the Supreme Court made no attempt to interpret the Florida
statute but held only that the statute, as interpreted by the state court, did not
"transcend the limits of" state power.
69. People v. Merrill, 2 Parker's Crim. Rep. 590, 600 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1855).
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time as conclusive, may be overcome by an unmistakable manifesta-
tion of the legislative intent, but not by words merely broad enough for
such a possible interpretation.
The territorial principle of criminal jurisdiction extends to the ships
of the nation which are its "floating territory," so to speak. 70  So far as
the territorial principle per se is concerned, this jurisdiction is exclusive
when the vessel is on the high seas71 and concurrent when it is in a for-
eign port, in which situation the local jurisdiction is dominant.72 The
established practice, however, is for the local jurisdiction to be exer-
cised only in rather extreme cases. As said in a famous case:
And so by comity it came to be generally understood among
civilized nations that all matters of discipline and all things done
on board which affected only the vessel or those belonging to her,
and did not involve the peace or dignity of the country, or the tran-
quillity of the port, should be left by the local government to be
dealt with by the authorities of the nation to which the vessel be-
longed as the laws of that nation or the interests of its commerce
should require. But if crimes are committed on board of a char-
acter to disturb the peace and tranquillity of the country to which
the vessel has been brought, the offenders have never by comity
or usage been entitled to any exemption from the operation of the
local laws for their punishment, if the local tribunals see fit to assert
their authority. 7
3
For an offense to disturb the peace and tranquillity of the port, it
is not essential that the crime be such that it was known outside the
vessel at the time.
If the thing done-'the disorder,' as it is called in the treaty-is of
a character to affect those on shore or in the port when it becomes
known, the fact that only those on the ship saw it when it was done,
is a matter of no moment.
74
Hence a Belgian who killed another Belgian on a Belgian ship in a
70. "Upon the high seas, every vessel, public or private, is, for jurisdictional pur-
poses, a part of the territory of the nation of its owners." People v. Tyler, 7 Mich. 160,
209 (1859).
71. Id. See also United States v. Holmes, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat), 412, 417 (1820).
"The term 'high seas' does not. . . indicate any separate and distinct body of water; but
only the open waters of the sea or ocean, as distinguished from ports and havens and
waters within narrow headlands on the coast." United States v. Rodgers, 150 U.S. 249,
254-55 (1893).
72. "It is part of the law of civilized nations that when a merchant vessel of one
country enters the ports of another for the purposes of trade, it subjects itself to the
law of the place to which it goes, unless by treaty or otherwise the two countries have
come to some different understanding or agreement ...... Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S.
1, 11 (1887).
73. Id. at 12.
74. Id. at 17.
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New Jersey port was held for trial in New Jersey although the killing was
with a knife and was known at the time only by other members of the
crew on board.
75
Whatever the nature of the offense, the "home" country will not
hesitate to try the offender if the local government does not see fit to
do so. In one case,76 for example, the defendant, an American citizen,
while a member of the crew of a vessel sailing under the British flag,
killed another on board the vessel at a time when it was in the river
Garonne, within the boundaries of the French empire. Having been
charged with the murder in England, the accused claimed there was no
jurisdiction to try him there. He was convicted of manslaughter. In
affirming the conviction, the court said:
Although the prisoner was subject to the American jurisprudence as
an American citizen, 77] and to the law of France as having com-
mitted the offence within the territory of France, yet he must also
be considered as subject to the jurisdiction of British law, which ex-
tends to the protection of British vessels, though in ports belonging
to another country.
78
Novel situations developing in the "space age" have given rise to
searching questions. 79 One, which seems not to require extensive dis-
cussion is this: What would be the legal situation if in some future
venture one of our astronauts should kill another, in the spaceship,
while far out in space? The answer is obvious. Just as a water-
borne vessel on the high seas is part of the "floating territory" of the
nation whose flag it flies, 0 and the people thereon fully under its juris-
diction, so a spaceship in space is part of the "flying territory" of the
nation from which it was launched, and the astronauts therein fully ac-
countable under its laws.
The question which seems to have given rise to the greatest contro-
versy is this: If in some future moonlanding venture one of our astro-
nauts should kill another after the spaceship had landed and the men
were walking about on the moon, would there be any law applicable to
this homicide?
For the answer to this question we need to turn to the common
law of England. While this law did not adopt the Roman theory of
75. Id.
76. Regina v. Anderson, 11 Cox Crim. Cas. 198 (1868).
77. The court apparently assumed that the United States exercised the Roman
principle of criminal jurisdiction in homicide cases.
78. 11 Cox Crim. Cas. at 204.
79. What follows did not appear in the original article because the problems had
not received widespread attention at the time it was prepared.
80. People v. Tyler, 7 Mich. 161, 209 (1859).
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jurisdiction, it refused to accept any such concept as a legal vacuum.
To repeat an earlier quotation:
Where Englishmen establish themselves in an uninhabited or bar-
barous country, they carry with them not only the laws, but the
sovereignty of their own State; and those who live amongst them
and become members of their community become also partakers
of and subject to the same laws.
8 '
This, of course, is the basis of our common law in this country. When
the English colonists came to these shores, finding no law here-or at
least none that they recognized-they brought with them the En-
glish law. And this included not only the common law but the English
statutes in force at that time."' "The common law is all the statutory
and case law background of England and the American colonies be-
fore the American Revolution."
8 3
Hence with us, as in England, there is no such concept as a legal
vacuum. If our people go to an uninhabited or barbarous place they
carry with them not only the laws, but the sovereignty of the United
States. Our astronauts who land on the moon are as completely sub-
ject to the federal law as if they had landed upon ground under the spe-
cial territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
84
This does not mean that since our astronauts were first on the
moon, the entire satellite is our territory, continuously subject to our
law. The English colonists did not bring the law of England to this
entire continent, but only to the part occupied by them and their fol-
lowers and descendants. And had they all given up and returned to
England they would have taken the English law back with them, leav-
ing this continent as they had found it. If the decision to return had
been made very promptly, but not until one Englishman had killed
another on land here, the slayer would have been triable in England for
that homicide.85
81. Note 62 supra.
82. "These statutes being passed before the emigration of our ancestors, being
applicable to our situation, and in amendment of the law, constitute a part of our
common law." Patterson v. Winn, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 233, 241 (1831) (Story, J.).
83. People v. Rehman, 253 Cal. App. 2d 119, 150, 61 Cal. Rptr. 65, 85 (1967).
As implied in Story's statement in the preceding note, this is subject to a slight qual-
ification. A few of the provisions of the English law, such as those based upon feu-
dalism, were not appropriate to the conditions here and were not recognized in this
country.
84. See 18 U.S.C. § 7(3) (1964).
85. This would have been long before an English statute had applied the Roman
theory of criminal jurisdiction to English subjects who commit homicide abroad. See
note 39 supra. But it is a necessary result of the concept of no legal vacuum.
The reference to Englishmen who "establish" themselves in an uninhabited coun-
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The answer to the question posed is that if, during some future
venture, one of our astronauts should kill another after they had landed
on the moon and were walking around on the satellite, he would be tri-
able for that homicide in the federal district court of the district in
which he landed on his return, or any district in which he was found. 6
If only two had gone on that particular trip there might be no evidence
to convict of either murder or manslaughter. Even so the slayer could
not safely boast of what he had done."'
This leaves one important question unanswered: If on some future
moonlanding adventure American astronauts and Russian astronauts
(for example) should happen to land at the same time, and at approxi-
mately the same place, and moments later, while walking on the sur-
face of the moon, a member of one group should kill a member of the
other-what is to be said as to jurisdiction of this homicide if it is
claimed to have been without justification or excuse?
The early judges did not give consideration to the problem arising
out of the coincidental appearance of Englishmen and the nationals of
another country at some barbarous or uninhabited place. They were
clear that if the Englishmen were there first they took the laws and sov-
ereignty of England with them and if others joined them they were
"partakers of, and subject to the same laws."' 8 This would mean that
the Englishmen, if they reached such a place already occupied by the
others, would be subject to the laws of the other nation. We have, how-
ever, no firm basis for an answer to the question posed.
Rather than leave it unanswered until the factual situation is ac-
tually presented, it would be wise to have the situation covered by ap-
propriate federal legislation. The act of Congress could be patterned
try must not be overinterpreted. The concept of no legal vacuum would not permit
the theory that the Englishmen landed in such a country subject to no law and that it
was only after some undetermined period that the English law and sovereignty sud-
denly jumped over to them.
86. "The trial of all crimes ...shall be held in the State where the said Crime
shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall
be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by law have directed." U.S. CONST.
art. M, § 2, cl. 3. "The accused in criminal prosecutions is entitled to a trial in the
state and district wherein the crime was committed." Id., amend. VI.
If the crime were committed out of the jurisdiction of any state or district, the
trial shall be in the district where the offender is found, or into which he is first
brought. 28 U.S.C. § 102 (1964).
87. With reference to the corpus delicti rule, it may be pointed out that this
would be entirely different from the ordinary case of a missing person. Under any-
thing like present conditions, if two make a trip to the moon and only one returns, we
would not need more to be satisfied that the other was dead. See R. PEfR=Ns,
CRIMINAL LAw 97-100 (2d ed. 1969).
88. Note 62 & accompanying text, supra.
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somewhat after the suggestion found in a proposed new Federal Crimi-
nal Code. This provision is to the effect that federal jurisdiction is to
be extended to include an offense if it "is committed by or against a na-
tional of the United States outside the jurisdiction of any nation." 9
This would give the United States extraterritorial criminal juris-
diction by the exercise of the Roman principle (by a national of the
United States) and the injured forum principle (against such a na-
tional). The power of Congress to extend criminal jurisdiction beyond
the territorial in appropriate cases is well recognized,9" but the sug-
gested statute seems to be, in some respects, too broad, and in others too
narrow. The wording would seem to give the federal courts jurisdiction
over cases that from the first have been dealt with exclusively as state
offenses.91 An ordinary murder on Market Street in San Francisco, for
example, is an offense "committed . . . outside the jurisdiction of any
nation, 92 because California is not a nation.93  On the other side, the
suggested wording is questionable because of the emphasis placed by
many countries on the Roman principle of criminal jurisdiction. Be-
cause of the French statute on the subject94 it is arguable that no place
where a citizen of France happens to be is "outside the jurisdiction of'
France.
Despite possible arguments against these conclusions, it would seem
wise to avoid controversy by wording such a statute in terms of ex-
tending the jurisdiction of the federal courts to include "an offense
committed by or against a national of the United States outside the
territorial jurisdiction of any state or nation."
89. STuDY DRAFT OF A NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE § 208(h) (1970) (pre-
pared by the NAT'L COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAws established pur-
suant to Pub. L. No. 89-801 (Nov. 8, 1966) ).
90. United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922); Rivard v. United States, 375
F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1967); Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1961);
United States v. Rodriguez, 182 F. Supp. 479 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
91. One writer, without specific reference to the section quoted, says: "This
study draft, if enacted, will be the charter of a national police force, with all this
implies." Liebmann, Chartering a National Police Force, 56 A.B.A.J. 1176, 1180
(1970).
92. See note 89 supra.
93. Such a crime is within the United States but it is not "an offense within the
jurisdiction of the United States" unless there is some federal aspect involved. That
requirement would be satisfied if the victim were a federal marshal engaged in the per-
formance of his official duties. 18 U.S.C. § 1114 (1964).
94. "Any French citizen who outside the territory of the Republic renders himself
guilty of an act qualified as a felony punished by French law may be prosecuted and
tried by French courts." FRENCH CODE OF CRIM. PRO., art. 689 (G. Kock transl.
1964). The second paragraph of the article makes a similar provision as to misde-
meanors limited, for the most part, to acts punishable where committed.
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